Abstract: The expectations hypothesis is a theory of the term structure of interest rates that describes a conventional view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. According to the expectations hypothesis, bond rates are related to current and expected movements in the policy-controlled rate. However, empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis are commonplace and lead many to question this description of policy transmission. This paper argues that failure to account for imperfect policy credibility may explain empirical rejections. Empirical rejections may occur even when changing anticipations of future short rates are the primary source of variation in bond rates and the standard term structure transmission channel remains valid.
Introduction
The expectations hypothesis is a theory of the term structure of interest rates that lays out a conventional view of the transmission channel of monetary policy. In particular, economic activity depends on market rates on securities of various maturities and the expectations hypothesis provides a link between such rates and the policy-controlled rate. Unfortunately, the literature is rife with empirical evidence against the expectations hypothesis. Such evidence is troubling as the conventional description of monetary policy transmission rests on the hypothesis that variation in current bond rates is driven by variation in current and expected movements of the policy-controlled short-term rate.
A commonly o ered explanation for empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis is that the term premium on multi-period yields is time-varying. 1 As Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983) concluded: \Variations in risk premiums are so large as to destroy any information in the term structure about future interest rates." This paper o ers an alternative explanation of the empirical rejections: Failure to adequately model expectations and to account for imperfect policy credibility may explain empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis. 2 An interesting feature of the explanation is that empirical rejections may occur even when variation in bond rates is being driven primarily by changing anticipations of future short rates|in other words, even though the term structure transmission channel remains valid.
The explanation of empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis presented in this paper centers on expectations and imperfect information. Carefully accounting for expectations formation 1 Tests of the expectations hypothesis are based on an assumption that the term premium on multi-period yields does not vary over time. 2 Other explanations have been o ered for empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis. See the discussion in Bekaert and Hodrick (2000) . First, as noted earlier, term premiums may be time-varying, not constant as assumed by the expectations hypothesis. Second, the expectations hypothesis may be correct, but tests may lead to false rejections owing to their poor small small sample properties (due to highly persistent variables as in McCallum (1994) or \peso problems" as in Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997b) ). Third, whereas the expectations hypothesis assumes rational expectations, investors may be irrational in that they may make systematic forecast errors. Expectations may be irrational if, for example, all or a fraction of the market is characterized by adaptive expectations. Fourth, agents may be subject to bounded rationality. Under bounded rationality agents are rational optimizers but do not have full information and must learn about their environment. Market participants may be subject to asymmetric information or may be acting in a complex system where linear approximations are used. The explanation o ered in this paper ts into the fourth grouping. Imperfect policy credibility as modeled in this paper implies systematic forecast errors. However, these errors obtain with rational expectations conditioned on a perceived in ation target that di ers from the true in ation target|in other words, because agents learn about the true in ation target only gradually.
in a world of imperfect information is important within the context of the term structure of interest rates. This is because theories of the term structure relate yields on multi-period securities to expectations of future shorter-term interest rates. In particular, the continuous-time yield to maturity on an n-period bond can be expressed as: R n;t = 1 n n?1 X i=0 E t R t+i + n;t
( 1) where R t is the one-period yield in t and n;t is the term premium on an n-period bond in t.
3 Under the assumption that the term premium is constant over time, i.e., n;t = n , (1) corresponds to the log expectations hypothesis. 4 Issues related to policy credibility are important for the term structure of interest rates. Yields contain implicit information on expectations of policy goals. Long-horizon yields are related to long-horizon expectations of the policy-controlled rate. 5 The policy rate, as a nominal variable, embeds in ationary expectations. Consequently, although short-horizon expectations of the policy rate may predominantly re ect transitory cyclical factors, long-horizons expectations of the policy rate re ect conditional views of long-horizon expectations of in ation, and these long-horizon expectations are anchored by market perceptions of the price and/or in ation goal of monetary policy.
The explanation o ered in this paper draws on the U.S. monetary policy experience. Several other policy-based explanations of the empirical rejections have been provided, but none focus on issues related to monetary policy credibility. Mankiw and Miron (1986) suggest that the failure of the expectations hypothesis may be due to the Federal Reserve's commitment to stabilizing interest rates. Using a small model, McCallum (1994) shows that interest rate smoothing, combined with policy responses to long rate movements may explain some empirical rejections. Rudebusch (1995) argues that Federal Reserve targeting behavior, including discrete target changes with transitory deviations of the funds rate from the target, short-term interest rate smoothing, and medium-term target persistence account for emirical results. Dotsey and Otrok (1995) suggest Federal Reserve behavior that smooths interest rates and moves discretely, in combination with time-varying term 3 See, for instance, the derivation in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b) . 4 See the discussion in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) on pages 413-418. For simplicity, we generally use the terminology \expectations hypothesis" and drop the reference to \log" in the text. 5 For simplicity in this paper the terms one-period rate, short rate, and policy rate are used interchangeably.
premiums may explain empirical regularities. While these four articles focus on Federal Reserve interest rate targeting behavior, Fuhrer (1996) explores the implications of shifts in monetary policy regimes. This article has some features in common with Fuhrer, but the di erences are fundamental. In particular, while Fuhrer considers the possibility of time-varying in ation targets, his analysis gives agents full contemporaneous knowledge of the policy regime. This paper diverges from most empirical studies by relaxing the standard assumptions of full information and policy credibility.
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A standard assumption, either explicit or implicit, in macroeconomic policy modeling is that private agents know the central bank's in ation target.
7
This paper relaxes this full information assumption. The central bank is assumed to have private information derived from knowledge about its in ation target. Private agents must infer the central bank's target from policy actions. This informational asymmetry gives rise to imperfect policy credibility and private agent perceptions about the central bank's target for in ation may deviate from the central bank's true target at any point in time.
Evidence from survey data suggests that private agents are slow to adjust their beliefs. Long-horizon survey expectations of in ation declined only gradually in the 1980s although actual in ation retreated quite quickly under Volcker. Actions taken by the Federal Reserve in October 1979 may be taken as a signal that the implicit target for in ation was being adjusted down forcefully. Refering to the decisions taken by the Federal Reserve on October 6, 1979, then-chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Paul Volcker, noted on November 13, 1979:
The clear and present danger was that failure to deal with in ation and in ationary expectations would in time produce more{not less{economic instability, ultimately with higher prices and greater unemployment. In that setting, the priority for policy was decisive action to deal with in ationary pressures and to defuse the dangerous 6 The treatment of credibility in this paper deals with the issue of transition to a new unknown policy regime. As noted by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) , virtually all of the literature ignores this issue. One notable exception is the Federal Reserve Board's model of the U.S. economy, FRB/US. Brayton, Levin, Tryon, and Williams (1997) use the FRB/US model to illustrate the implications of di erent assumptions about information and learning in simulations of a change in the in ation target. Most of the existing literature deals with credibility issues as part of the discretion versus commitment debate. Sargent (1999) may provide impetus to increase research into private sector learning about transition to a new unknown regime.
7 Taylor (1999) presents a collection of papers that address important monetary policy issues. Although, as Taylor puts it, \the papers in the volume share an important common methodology that de nes the state of the art in monetary policy evaluation research," all of the models assume that private agents know the central bank's in ation target. A recent exception is Huh and Lansing (2000) . expecational forces that were jeopardizing the orderly functioning of nancial and commodity markets.
However, after several years of elevated in ation, private agents did not initially believe that a new regime of lower in ation would last. The di culties were voiced by then-Chairman Volcker himself in a statement before the Joint Economic Committee on October 17, 1979:
An entire generation of young adults has grown up since the mid-1960s knowing only in ation, indeed an in ation that has seemed to accelerate inexorably. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that many citizens have begun to wonder whether it is realistic to anticipate a return to general price staibility, and have begun to change their behavior accordingly. In ation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of in ationary expectations. Meulendyke (1998) concurs that when the Federal Reserve changed FOMC policy in October 1979 after accelerating in ation over the preceding decade, the central banks's credibility with the public had been low after previous e orts to slow in ation had been followed by further price acceleration. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) use survey evidence to argue that during the Volcker disin ation in the early 1980s, private agents only gradually adjusted down their views of the rate of in ation implicitly being targeted by the Federal Reserve and credibility was slow to improve. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the early 1980s provide an example of imperfect policy credibility.
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In addition to the focus on monetary policy credibility, another important feature of this paper that distinguishes it from the other papers with policy-based explanations is the scope of the analysis. Previous studies have tended to focus on empirical regularities from one test of the expectations hypothesis. Miron (1986), McCallum (1994) , Rudebusch (1995) , and Dotsey and Otrok examine spread predictions for short-rate changes, while Fuhrer (1986) compares actual and theoretical spreads. Also, Fuhrer's analysis, like that of Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) , emphasizes ts of yields estimated based on the expectations hypothesis rather than tests of the 8 The slow adjustment of market expectations to the change in Federal Reserve policy during the early stages of the Volcker disin ation has also been noted by Blanchard (1984) and Huh and Lansing (2000) . Goodfriend(1995) suggests that even in the 1990s there was a lingering lack of Federal Reserve credibility. He points out that the long rate was in roughly the same range of 8 percent in November 1994 as in the late 1970s, despite an in ation rate that was 4 to 5 percentage points lower. expectations hypothesis. By contrast, this paper investigates whether imperfect monetary policy credibility can explain empirical regularities obtained from several di erent empirical approaches. This paper proceeds by showing that imperfect policy credibility is capable of explaining empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis based on three standard tests. In the next section, survey data on long-horizon in ation expectations is used as a proxy for market perceptions of the Federal Reserve's implicit in ation target. Tests of the expectations hypothesis based on spread predictions of long rate changes are reviewed within the context of imperfect policy credibility using the information provided by the survey data. Section 3 revisits the evidence that led Campbell and Shiller (1991) to conclude that variations in risk premiums are large. The empirical analysis contrasts the implications of using di erent VAR proxies for market expectations in constructions of theoretical spreads. Section 4 examines tests of the expectations hypothesis based on spread predictions of short rate changes. The implications of imperfect policy credibility are isolated by contrasting simulation results from a structural model with asymmetric information and learning to those from a similar model with symmetric information. Section 5 o ers concluding comments.
Implications of Imperfect Policy Credibility for Spread
Predictions of Long-Rate Changes Shiller (1979) and Campbell and Shiller (1991) report that when the spread between longer-term yields and shorter-term yields is relatively high, subsequent movements in the longer-term yields are inconsistent with the expectations hypothesis. This section suggests that their empirical ndings are consistent with the presence of lags between shifts in in ation and shifts in the perceived long-run in ation goal of monetary policy. The empirical evidence against the expectations hypothesis considered in this section is obtained from regressions of long-rate changes on yield spreads. In particular, the evidence is based on coe cient estimates of in the regression R n?m;t+m ? R n;t = + (m=(n ? m))(R n;t ? R m;t ) + resid t ; (2) where estimates of signi cantly di erent from the null hypothesis of one are interpreted as evidence against the expectations hypothesis. 9 Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983) , Mankiw and Summers (1984) , Campbell and Shiller (1991) , and Evans and Lewis (1994) nd that coe cient estimates of tend to be signi cantly di erent from one, and that typically the point estimates are negative.
The historical behavior of actual in ation and long-horizon in ation expectations may help explain the negative estimates of obtained when estimating equation (2). Long-horizon expectations of in ation are built into long-term nominal yields. When the gap between long-horizon in ation expectations and current in ation is large, the spread between long and short rates will also be relatively large re ecting the perceived low credibility of policy. As credibility for the in ation policy increases, long-horizon expectations of in ation will converge toward in ation and the gap between long-term interest rates and short-term interest rates will decrease. In other words, a large spread that re ects low policy credibility with long-horizon expectations of in ation above the current in ation rate will precede falling long rates if the credibility of policy improves.
An analysis of survey data on long-horizon in ation expectations and historical in ation supports this hypothesis. A comparison of movements in in ation and in survey expectations indicates that there are lengthy lags between movements in in ation and adjustments of long-run expectations of in ation. Average 4-quarter in ation rates and survey data on long-horizon expectations are shown in gure 1. At the end of the 1970s, in ation rates exceeded 12 percent. Following the appointment of Paul Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, monetary policy was tightened considerably in starting in October 1979. By 1983, in ation rates had fallen substantially to levels averaging around 4 percent. In ation rates remained low through the mid-1980s before rising somewhat. Survey data on long-horizon expectations, however, remained relatively high. Thus, the downward path of long-horizon expectations in the 1980s lagged considerably the trend movements in actual in ation. These data are consistent with the view that agents did not immediately believe that the lower in ation rates achieved by the Volcker disin ation would be sustained. The gradual decline in the survey data suggest that, as relatively low in ation rates persisted, policy gained credibility and private agents began to cautiously revise down their perceptions of the long-run in ation goal of policy.
Empirical results from estimation of the long-rate change equation in (2) are given in Table 1 .
Results are provided for 11 di erent (m; n) pairings and for 5 di erent sample periods. For m-values of 1, 3, or 12 months, the dependent variable in (2), R n?m;t+m ? R n;t was approximated by the change in the long rate, R n;t+m ? R n;t . This approximation is generally regarded as reasonable
for small values of m and large values of n.
10 Table 1 contains estimates of the coe cient and asymptotic standard errors corrected for residual serial correlation and heteroskedasticity following Newey and West (1987) , with the Newey and West (1994) automatic lag selection routine. Boldface entries are signi cantly di erent from 1, based on an asymptotic 95 percent con dence band.
Four results are noteworthy. First, when estimated over a sample during which shifts in long-run in ation expectations were less likely to have occurred, empirical results do not provide evidence against the expectations hypothesis. In particular, for the December 1946 -December 1961 and December 1946 -December 1971 samples, all but one or two estimates of are insigni cantly di erent from one for the (m; n) maturity pairings considered. Second, coe cients estimates of are generally negative and signi cantly di erent from one when estimated over a sample that contains shifts in long-horizon in ation expectations. Third, for (m; n) = (60,120), regression results do not reject the expectations hypothesis. Since expected ve-year in ation rates are likely very close to expected ten-year in ation rates, the size of the spread between 10-year yields and 5-year yields will not be driven by the gap between long-horizon in ation expectations and current in ation.
Thus, regression results for (m; n) = (60,120) are probably not being driven by credibility issues.
Fourth, bias concerns raised by Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997a) may explain rejections of the expectations hypothesis that occur when point estimates of are signi cantly greater than one.
In particular, shifts in long-run expectations are least likely to be an issue for (m; n) = (60,120) and for estimations over December 1946 -December 1961 . And, in these instances, point estimates of are often greater than one in magnitude, as would be expected if coe cient estimates are upward biased due to persistence in the short-rate process.
Under the interpretation suggested above, the gap between long-horizon expected in ation and short-term expected in ation should predict ex post changes in long-horizon in ation expectations with a negative coe cient. Consequently, the following two regression equations were also estimated:
(1 ? t+m ) ?1 s;t+m ? (1 ? t ) ?1 s;t = + (m=(n ? m))(1 ? t ) ?1 ( s;t ? t ) + resid t (3) 10 Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983) and Campbell and Shiller (1991) use this approximation. Mankiw and Summers (1984) implicitly made this substitution. Although the equation they report appears to suggest that no approximation is necessary, their derivation is based on the yield on a consol, an in nitely lived bond, rather than the yield on a nite-maturity bond. However, in their empirical work, they approximate the yield on a consol with the yield on a constant maturity 20-year Treasury security. and s;t+m ? s;t = + (m=(n ? m))( s;t ? t ) + resid t (4) where s;t is survey data on 10-year in ation expectations, and is an estimate of the tax rate on bond earnings. The format of both equations assumes that m is small, n is large, and that expectations of annualized (n ?m)-month in ation are roughly equal to expectations of annualized n-month in ation. The rst equation contains tax adjustments to more closely approximate the movements of the in ation components implicitly contained in the pre-tax bond rate version of the regression equation in (2). Under positive tax rates, nominal rates will move more than one-for-one with expected in ation.
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Empirical results from estimation of these in ation change equations are provided in Table 2 for two di erent sample periods using available survey data on long-horizon in ation. Empirical results are somewhat sensitive to inclusion of the rst two years of data. This is not surprising as the Federal Reserve was following a di erent policy regime from October 1979 through September 1982 than afterwards.
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The bottow panel of Table 2 includes results from estimation of long-rate change equations over the two sample periods for comparison purposes.
Results in the top two panels of Table 2 suggest that when long-horizon in ation expectations are above current in ation, market participants revise down their long-horizon in ation expectations.
Comparison of results in the top panel with those in the middle panel suggest that the presence of non-trivial taxes magni es the result. The results support our view that subsequent to the high in ation episodes in the 1970s and 1980s, monetary policy was not viewed as credibly controlling long-run in ation. In particular, survey respondents did not initially believe that, over the long-run, policy could maintain the low in ation rates achieved by the Volcker disin ation of the early 1980s. As in ation remained below long-horizon expectations, the Federal Reserve gradually gained credibility and survey data indicates that long-horizon in ation expectations slowly moved closer to observed in ation rates.
Implications of Alternative Models of Expectations for Comparisons of \Theoretical" Spreads to Actual Spreads
The previous section used survey data to suggest that imperfect policy credibility, particularly in the 1980s, is an important feature of U.S. economic history that could explain empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis. This section moves from survey data to proxies of agent expectations based on forecasts from time-series models. The point of this section is to show that some empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis based on comparisons of \theoretical" spreads to actual spreads are fragile to the speci cation of the time-series model used to proxy for expectations. When model speci cations generate long-horizon forecasts that resemble measures of long-horizon market expectations, the strong evidence against the expectations hypothesis largely disappears. Furthermore, the evidence that led Campbell and Shiller to conclude that variations in risk premiums are large turns out to be fragile. The strategy of this section follows Campbell and Shiller (1991) . Actual spreads are equal to S n;m;t = R n;t ? R m;t
where R k;t is the yield on a k-period bond. Theoretical spreads excluding term premiums are constructed by replacing yields, R k;t , with empirical proxies of average expected one-period yields.
VARs are used to proxy expectations. In companion form, the VARs can be represented as:
where for a VAR with p lags, X t is a stacked vector containing contemporaneous and p ? 1 lags of the VAR variables, and (t) 1 is a vector of endpoints of the VAR variables (i.e., limiting conditional expectations with (t) 1 = lim k!1 E t X t+k ).
13
Using these VAR proxies and de ning to be a vector of zeros with a single one identifying the position of R t in X t , \theoretical" k-period yields excluding term premium are:
and \theoretical" spreads (excluding term premium) between yields on n-and m-period yields are:
S T n;m;t = (1=n)
13 Campbell and Shiller (1991) provide a description of companion form representation of VARs and Tinsley (1998 and 2001b) provide more details on endpoints.
Comparing S T n;m;t with S n;m;t aids in assessing the relative contributions to variation in bond yields of time variation in term premiums and shifts in expected short rates. If the VAR adequately approximates market expectations, and time variation in term premiums is small relative to movements in expected short rates, then S T n;m;t and S n;m;t should be highly correlated and the ratio of their standard deviations should be close to one. Three di erent VAR speci cations are used to approximate the expectations of agents.
14 Each VAR contains three variables: a one-month nominal interest rate, in ation, and the rate of capacity utilization. The VARs di er only in their assumptions about the long-run behavior of interest rates and in ation rates. Although VARs are generally regarded as atheoretic, long-run conditional forecasts of in ation from the VARs (i.e., the in ation endpoints) can be interpreted as corresponding to implied in ation targets. 15 Consequently, di erences in the long-run behavior of interest rates and in ation rates in the VAR proxies for expectations imply di erent views on the perceived in ation target of monetary policy.
Two of the VARs include standard atheoretic assumptions that variables are I(0) or I(1). However, as shown by Tinsley (1998 and 2001a) , proxies for long-horizon in ation expectations based on forecasts from standard mean-reverting and rst-di erenced AR and VAR models do not match survey estimates. The third VAR considered is a shifting-endpoint VAR for which the properties of long-horizon forecasts resemble measures of market expectations. Tinsley (1998 and 2001a) showed that proxies for long-horizon expectations based on forecasts from shifting-endpoint AR and VAR models were more successful at capturing aspects of imperfect policy credibility as evident in survey data. In particular, shifting-endpoint AR and VAR models are capable of generating series for long-horizon in ation expectations that adjust slowly and with a signi cant lag compared to actual in ation, similar to the properties of long-horizon survey data. included in levels. Point estimates of VAR coe cients are such that long-horizon forecasts of interest rates and in ation converge to their respective sample means. The macroeconomic interpretation of this property is that the rst VAR assumes that the perceived in ation goal of monetary policy is equal to the sample mean of in ation and did not change over the estimation sample.
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The second VAR is a moving average endpoints VAR. In this VAR unit root restrictions are imposed on interest rates and in ation rates.
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With unit root restrictions imposed, the in ation endpoint is a moving average of in ation and the interest rate endpoint is a moving average of interest rates. The macroeconomic interpretation of this property is that the second VAR assumes that the perceived in ation target follows recent in ation quite closely.
The third VAR is a shifting endpoints VAR. Interest rate endpoints are extracted from bond yields with the nominal rate endpoint approximated as: n 0 (r n 0 ;t ? n 0) ? n(r n;t ? n ) n 0 ? n :
In ation endpoints are taken from Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a) . These endpoints are constructed from a learning model and roughly follow long-horizon survey data. Thus, in this VAR, the perceived in ation target matches long-horizon survey data reasonably. Campbell and Shiller (1991) calculated the standard deviation ratios and correlations between S T n;m;t and S n;m;t across a range of maturity pairings (n; m) for one VAR speci cation. They found that correlations were almost always positive and often very high and that the standard deviation of S T n;m;t to the standard deviation of S n;m;t was typically around one-half. They concluded that the spread is too variable to accord with the simple expectations model.
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However, their conclusion rests on the assumption that the VAR they used adequately approximates market expectations. As will be shown, estimates of the theoretical spread are very sensitive to VAR endpoint speci cations. When theoretical spreads are constructed using the VAR speci cation with shifting endpoints|the 17 Mean-reversion of real interest rates may be a reasonable assumption. Barr and Campbell (1997) provide evidence to suggest that, at least for U.K. data, the real rate is relatively stable at long horizons. Evans and Lewis (1995) nd that after accounting for rationally anticipated shifts in the in ation process, evidence from U.S. data is consistent with a stationary ex ante real rate. However, mean-reversion of nominal interest rates and in ation is controversial. 18 Although interest rates and in ation may be cointegrated after accounting for tax e ects, the presence of time-varying tax rates complicates modeling cointegration. Cointegration with time-varying cointegrating coe cients is beyond the scope of this paper.
19 Simulations in Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) suggest a strong term premium response to changes in the short policy rate (about the same strength as the response of the average of expected short rates).
VAR that does the best job at matching survey data on market expectations|evidence is generally supportive of the expectations hypothesis. Table 3 compares the theoretical spread, S T 120;1;t with the actual spread S 120;1;t for six di erent estimation periods and across the three VAR speci cations. The table reports correlations between the theoretical and actual spreads and the ratio of the standard deviation of the theoretical spread to the standard deviation of the actual spread. Results are consistent across all subsamples. In all cases, correlations of theoretical spreads calculated using the shifting endpoints VAR are closer to one than the theoretical spreads calculated using either of the other two VAR speci cations. In all but one sample, standard deviation ratios are also closer to one when theoretical spreads are calculated using the shifting endpoints VAR. For the VAR proxy of market expectations that comes closest to matching survey data, i.e., the shifting endpoints VAR, the empirical evidence is generally supportive of the expectations hypothesis and suggests that variation in long rates is likely primarily due to variation in expected short rates, not to time-varying term premium. This evidence supports another plausible interpretation of the results in Campbell and Shiller (1991) . In particular, tests of the expectations hypothesis with model-based expectations are tests of the joint hypothesis that the expectations hypothesis is valid and that the forecasting model used adequately approximates market expectations. Results in Table 3 suggest that empirical rejections could be indicating that a particular VAR speci cation is a poor proxy for market expectations.
Implications of Imperfect Policy Credibility for Spread
Predictions of Short-Rate Changes Imperfect policy credibility with lags between movements in in ation and movements in market expectations of long-horizon in ation expectations is consistent with historical data and appears to be a possible explanation of empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis. This section considers a third class of empirical tests of the expectations hypothesis based on spread predictions of short rate changes. Two complementary explanations of the empirical results are presented. One explanation focuses on empirical rejections for short horizon short-rate changes. This explanation argues that imperfect policy credibility may explain empirical rejections. Results from simulation of a small forward-looking structural macro model are o ered in support of this explanation. The second explanation focuses on non-rejections at the long end of the term structure. Correlation results from both historical data and simulated data suggest estimated coe cients from test regressions are picking up correlations between the current short rate that is used in de ning both the regressor and regressand. The empirical evidence examined in this section is obtained from regressions of ex post short-rate changes on yield spreads. In particular, evidence is based on coe cient estimates of in the regression
(1 ? i=k) m R m;t+im = 1=k k?1 X i=1 R m;t+im ? R m;t = + (R n;t ? R m;t ) + resid t (10) where k = n=m and m R m;t+im = R m;t+m ? R m;t . 20 An empirical rejection of the null hypothesis that equals one is taken as evidence against the expectations hypothesis. Empirical results from estimation of the short-rate change equation (10) are given in Table 4 for nine (m; n) pairings and ve sample periods. Similar to the ndings of Campbell and Shiller (1991) , evidence is generally consistent with the null hypothesis for relatively large n. However, for n equal to 3 months or 12 months, the evidence is less supportive of the null hypothesis. Nevertheless, contrary to the results for the long-rate change regressions, regression coe cient estimates always imply predictions for short-rate changes in the direction predicted by the expectations hypothesis. 
Imperfect Policy Credibility
The rst explanation of the empirical results is based on the observation that even if the expectations hypothesis is true, ex post short rates may not on average correspond with ex ante forecasts of short rates. Di erences may exist on average if the market-perceived goals of policy di er from the true goals of policy. In previous sections it was suggested that at times gaps likely existed between the actual in ation goals of the Federal Reserve policymakers and the policy goals inferred by the market. Given the absence of announced credible in ation targets in the United States, market participants were unaware of the Federal Reserve's price and/or in ation goals and had to make inferences about policy based on observable Federal Reserve actions. Through the 1980s, a monetary policy goal of low and stable in ation was not viewed as credible. Furthermore, survey data suggests that market perceptions of the Federal Reserve's implicit in ation target adjusted very slowly. Thus, for U.S. data that includes the 1980s, it shouldn't be surprising to nd that ex post short rates don't correspond on average with ex ante forecasts of short rates based on spreads.
A pair of similar structural macro models are used to evaluate the validity of the hypothesis that imperfect policy credibility may contribute to empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis. The di erence between the two models is that one assumes symmetric information on the part of policymakers and other economic agents whereas the other assumes that policymakers have more information about their in ation goal than other economic agents. In both models, long-term interest rates are constructed according to the expectations hypothesis but with the constant term premium set equal to zero, i.e., according to (1) with n;t = 0. Consequently, one might expect that in both models, spreads between long rates and short rates should on average forecast short-rate changes as predicted by the expectations hypothesis. However, if tests based on the credible policy model do not reject but tests based on the imperfect policy credibility model do reject, then the exercise provides evidence to support the proposed explanation|namely, that imperfect policy credibility may explain empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis.
The structural macro model with policy credibility (symmetric information) is a simpli ed version of a Fuhrer-Moore model, but with an explicit in ation target that may shift over time.
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The model is a hybrid with some characteristics of the small optimizing models of, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) , McCallum and Nelson (1999) , and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and some of the persistence properties of reduced form models, such as Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) , designed to improve realism of outcomes. 23 An innovation in this paper is the explicit treatment of the in ation target as a separate variable.
In ation, t , depends on the expectation of the next period's in ation rate, lagged in ation, the deviation of output from potential, y t , and a shock, ;t :
two-period wage contracting model that is a variant of Taylor (1980) .
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The aggregate spending relation assumes persistence of demand, with changes in the output gap (or equivalently in the speci cation given here, the deviation of output growth from the percent change in potential output), responding negatively to the deviation of the expected real policy rate, r e t ? E t t+1 , from its steady state value, rr, and positively to shocks, y;t , y t = y t?1 ? 0:2(r e t ? E t t+1 ? rr) + y;t :
Although some speci cations, including Fuhrer (1995a and 1995b) , assume that aggregate spending depends on a long-term interest rate, such a speci cation was purposely avoided here.
25
A speci cation with output depending on a long rate would be preferred, but (12) is a standard speci cation in atheoretic VARs and insulates test results against feedback from the long rate to the short rate. If aggregate spending were to depend on a long rate, then feedback from long rates to the policy rate in the reduced form model might a ect the properties of the test statistics.
shock doesn't directly a ect the economy. The presence of the transitory policy shock is important, however, as it means that in the second version of the model, the unobserved in ation target can not be directly inferred from the observed policy rate. Unlike McCallum (1994), Dotsey and Otrok (1995) , Rudebusch (1995) and Fuhrer (1996) , the policy excludes an interest rate smoothing motive on behalf of the monetary authority. In the model, persistence in the policy rate is driven by persistence in either in ation, the in ation target, or the output gap.
The in ation target, T t , is assumed to remain the same from one period to the next unless changed by a permanent target shock, T;t , T t = T t?1 + T;t
In the implementation of the model, T;t is usually equal to zero|re ecting that changes in the policy target are infrequent. The in ation target is assumed to be credibly observed by private agents.
The n-period yield is de ned according to the expectations hypothesis, but, without loss of generality, the constant term premium is set equal to zero, r n;t = 0:25 n X i=0 E t r e t+i :
As noted earlier, the n-period yield doesn't enter into other equations, so no endogenous feedback e ects will alter the regression-based test statistics. The structural macro model with imperfect policy crediblity (asymmetric information) is almost the same as the model with policy credibility as described above in equations (11) -(16). The fundamental di erence is that the in ation target is assumed to be unobserved by private agents who gradually adjust their perceptions based on deviations of economic outcomes from their expectations. Since the in ation target is not observed, in the model with imperfect policy credibility, the equation for the expected short rate (14) is replaced by: r e t = 1:5 t ? 0:5 P t + 0:5y t + rr (17) in which the perceived target, P , replaces the target in ation rate, T . In addition, an equation is added to describe the process by which private agents update their perceptions of the policy target. Agents are assumed to update their perceptions of the policy target according to their error in forecasting the policy rate in the previous period, P t = P t?1 + 0:05(r e t?1 ? r t?1 ):
The forecast errors, r e t?1 ? r t?1 , contain two components: the policy shock r and the error in the perceptions of the target T ? P . Consequently, agents are not able to perfectly infer their misperceptions about the in ation target. In updating their perceptions, if the policy rate was higher than expected, then policy was tighter than expected and agents realize that the true in ation target may be lower than their perceived target. Consequently, the perceived target is lowered in response to an underprediction of the policy rate. Similarly, the perceived target is increased in response to an overprediction of the policy rate. Summarizing, the model with imperfect policy credibility is described by equations (11) - (13) and (15) - (18).
Each model is simulated for 320 time periods (representing 320 quarters, or 80 years). Over the simulation period the in ation target is subject to two non-zero shocks. Initially, the in ation target is set at 2 percent. After 170 quarters, the target is shifted up to 10 percent and, after an additional 59 quarters, the target is shifted back to 2 percent. Figure 2 shows the path of the policy target used in all the simulations with a representative path of the perceived target from a simulation of the model with imperfect policy credibility. Shocks to r;t , ;t , and y;t are drawn from independent normal distributions with a zero mean and standard deviation equal to 0.4 percent.
Prior to estimating the short-rate change regression in (10) with m = 1, the rst 100 simulated observations are dropped to eliminate starting value e ects, if any. Regressions are estimated over the next 200 observations (50 years) of simulated data, with the last 20 obervations necessary to construct the last 20 observations of the regressand (de ned as ex post averages of short rate changes). This exercise is repeated 10,000 times for both models. Table 5 reports the summary statistics from the short rate change regressions averaged over the 10,000 repetitions. Reported are average estimates of , standard deviations of estimates of , and the mean of the t-test statistic used to test the null hypothesis that = 1. In constructing the test statistics, standard errors were corrected for residual serial correlation using a Newey-West (1987) correction with 6 lags.
Results for the model with symmetric information are reported in the column labeled Credible Policy. For both the 4-period horizon and the 20-period horizon, estimates of are very close to one. In addition, tests of the expectations hypothesis do not reject the null hypothesis that equals one. Results for the model with asymmetric information are reported in the column labeled Imperfect Policy Credibility. These results are very di erent. Mean estimates of continue to be positive, but are no longer close to one. For the 4-period horizon, the mean estimate of is only 0.270 and the mean test statistic provides strong evidence against the null hypothesis. The mean estimate of is closer to one for the 20-period horizon experiment, however, evidence against the null hypothesis that = 1 continues to be strong.
Rejections of the expectations hypothesis under imperfect policy credibility occur despite the fact that term premium are constrained to equal zero in the simulations. In other words, even though by construction all variation in long rates is attributable to variation in expected short rates, the test of the expectations hypothesis rejects.
An econometric issue
The second explanation of the empirical results argues that the regression speci cation, although well-suited for short-rate processes with unit roots, is poorly suited for short-rate processes that are mean-reverting, or that revert to a shifting endpoint. For such speci cations regression coe cients may pick up correlation between the current short rate embedded in the de nition of the regressand (ex post short rate changes) and the current short rate embedded in the de nition of the regressor (the spread).
The intuition for this argument is as follows. First, an n-period moving average of a series that follows a mean-reverting process is less variable than the underlying series. Consequently, if the stochastic process followed by short rates is mean-reverting then, for large n, most of the variation in the regressand, i.e., in the di erence between the n-period forward moving average of short rates and the current short rate, will be due to variation in the current short rate. Second, most of the variation in the regressor constructed as the spread between a long rate and a short rate is due to variation in the short rate. Third, regression techniques generate coe cient estimates designed to minimize unexplained variation in the regressand. Putting these three observations together, estimates of in the standard short-rate change regression may largely be driven by the dominating presence of the short rate in both the regressand and the single non-constant regressor (the spread). As duration/horizon increases, this phenomenon becomes more important.
Correlation results from historical data and simulated data support this explanation. Table 6 provides correlations between an ex post estimate of the spread, an ex post average of short rates, the long rate, the short rate, and the spread between the long rate and the short rate. The ex post estimate of the spread is equal to the regressand in the short rate change regressions. As hypothesized, the correlation between the ex post spread and the spread increases with n in both the historical data and the simulated data.
The source of the positive relationship between the spread correlations and n appears to be due to correlations between the spreads and the short rate. As expected, the ex post spread is positively correlated with the ex post average of short rates and negatively correlated with the short rate. In all cases, the negative correlation between the ex post spread and the short rate is stronger than the positive correlation between the ex post spread and the ex post average of short rates. Furthermore, the negative correlation between the ex post spread and the short rate increases as n increases. This regularity is also apparent in correlations between the spread, the yield, and the short rate. In particular, correlations between the spread and the short rate are more strongly negative for larger n. Additionally, for large n, the negative correlation between the spread and the short rate is stronger than the correlation between the spread and the yield.
This section has illustrated that imperfect policy credibility and an econometric property of averages may explain empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis based on short rate change regressions. Empirical results similar to those observed in U.S. data were obtained using simulated data from a structural macro model with asymmetric information about the policy target and agent learning. The empirical rejections were obtained using the simulated data even though long rates were constructed to satisfy the expectations hypothesis.
Concluding Comments
This paper reviewed three standard empirical tests of the expectations hypothesis: spread predictions for long rate changes, comparisons of theoretical spreads to actual spreads, and spread predictions for short rate changes. Empirical evidence was shown to be consistent with what would be expected if market perceptions of the Federal Reserve's implicit in ation target shifted historically, and with a lag relative to actual policy. In other words, it was argued that empirical rejections might re ect incorrect assumptions about expectations formation rather than incorrect assumptions about the theoretical link between long rates and short rates.
An important lesson to be taken from the analysis of this paper is that empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis need not negate the validity of a standard transmission channel of monetary policy. 27 The presence of asymmetric information, in the form of imperfect monetary policy credibility in this paper, can lead to empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis even when the general theory that long rates primarily re ect expected short rates is valid.
Finally, one caveat is in order. Although this paper o ers an economic explanation of the empirical rejections of the expectations hypothesis based on asymmetric information, it should not be taken as re ecting a view on the part of the authors that term premium are not time-varying. The hypothesis that expected short rates are an important transmission channel of monetary policy does not require an assumption that the term premium is constant. 27 This lesson applies more broadly than illustrated by this paper. Researchers should be careful when using empirical results from tests of the expectations hypothesis to evaluate the term structure of interest rates as a transmission channel of monetary policy. An important criticism of empirical tests of the expectations hypothesis is that they rely heavily on the validity of the constant term premium assumption. Researchers may be interested in assessing whether whether variation in bond rates is primarily due to variation in short rate expectations. Time variation in term premium, particularly if only a secondary contributor to variation in bond rates, may not be an objectionable property. However, if term premium are positively correlated with short rates, as proposed by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) and many subsequent studies, then is likely to be less than one. Thus, empirical tests may reject the null hypothesis that = 1 and the expectations hypothesis even when changing anticipations of future short rates are primarily driving bond rates.
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